Fugitive oligarch Ilan Shor, sentenced in Moldova to 15 years in prison, has created a network of 37 companies in Kyrgyzstan that are used as financial bridges to circumvent sanctions imposed on Russia. The IPN agency, based on internal documents of the “A7” group, has established that, in six months, at least 480 billion rubles (approximately $6 billion) passed through these companies. In total, in one year, the “A7” group carried out operations worth approximately 1.686 trillion rubles ($20.75 billion).
The documents of the “A7” group provide a clear picture and show that, within the group’s international payment system, it is precisely the Kyrgyz companies that play the role of operational and financial bridges, through which liquidity in rubles is transformed into foreign currency and cryptocurrency payments, only to then “return” to the controlled circuit.
From a formal standpoint, it appears to be a banking product or service, but essentially, it is a set of tools that create a mechanism for minimizing the impact of sanctions and restrictions on payments made by Russian companies abroad. The entire process is based on the method of bill of exchange payments.
What data did we use?
The IPN Agency used internal documents of the A7 group, which were leaked on the internet after attacks on the IT infrastructure of Ilan Shor’s group. These are detailed documents that illustrate the structure and financial flows of the group, as well as data on transfers and payments between different structures within the group.
What is A7?
“A7” is a platform for cross-border payments, created by “Promsviazbank” (PSB), and Ilan Shor is associated with it as the CEO of the parent company (“A7-agent”). In July 2025, the European Union included the A7 platform in the sanctions list due to its ties with Ilan Shor.
What does the scheme look like?
The importer from Russia negotiates with the foreign supplier and pays for the goods in rubles through the company “A7” (or its agent “A71”).
By proxy, this bill of exchange is transmitted to a subagent in Kyrgyzstan, who pays the necessary currency to the supplier (dollars, yuan, etc.), the supplier sends the transfer confirmation (SWIFT), and then “A7” extinguishes the bill in rubles through the authorized bank (PSB). In the end, the external party receives the currency and the Russian party formally receives the payment in rubles – everything is documented by the bill of exchange, contracts, and payment reports.
In the reverse scheme, for exports, the money from abroad first goes into the account of a non-resident (in Kyrgyzstan), then the exchange is sold and presented for payment and the Russian exporter receives rubles from “A7”. A small commission is charged for these services (usually around 0.3% for imports; for exports, often 0%) and to encourage participants to keep the rubles in the system, bonuses and interest for large balances are provided in the documents – which economically stimulates not to withdraw money from the scheme.
The totality of factors transforms this architecture into an efficient evasion mechanism. Firstly, there is jurisdictional rotation: money can be redirected through the United Arab Emirates, Kyrgyzstan, Hong Kong and several other “test countries”. In each of them, there is a set of identical companies. Even if one is blocked, the payment is switched to another.
Secondly, exchange bills are sold among non-residents: formally, the currency ends up in the account of a third-party legal entity in Kyrgyzstan, and the payment in rubles takes place in Russia. This results in a “break” in the legal chain, and it is difficult for the foreign bank to understand who is, in fact, the real beneficiary and for what purpose the money has come.
Thirdly, there exists a crypto and OTC (over-the-counter, meaning off-exchange transactions) circuit. The rubles, once they reach Kyrgyzstan, are quickly converted into A7A5/USDT tokens through brokers and exchanges. Transfers on the blockchain and off-exchange trades are methods where banking sanctions and banking surveillance function poorly. Thus, traces are erased faster than on the classic SWIFT route.
The role of Kyrgyz companies
The IPN documentary base contains the register of Kyrgyz legal entities involved in operations: the largest and most active are “A7 Kyrgyzstan”, “Talas Global Merchants”, “Kush Trading Group”, “Old Vector”, “Kifiko”, “Tengricoin” and dozens of others.
The data received by IPN indicates which companies fulfill the roles of sub-agents, brokers, token issuers, or “intermediaries for exchange payments”. These elements show how tranches are distributed through the network of Kyrgyz legal entities and how the financing of operations is structured.
According to the documents and information received from sources, Ilan Shor plays a significant role in the formation of the Kyrgyz connections. His name appears in the accounting records as a beneficiary-recipient and in the registration and personal data of several structures; in certain payment registers, the payment of salaries is mentioned, “including that of the director – Ilan Mironovici Shor”.
Sources indicate that, under his coordination, a network of non-residents was established in the Kyrgyz Republic in the years 2023-2024.
A letter from Ilan Shor addressed to the vice president of Promsvyazbank (PSB), Alexandr Dorofeev, has also reached the possession of IPN. In it, the oligarch reports that, starting from the fall of 2024, “A7” has issued bills of exchange worth 1,686,440,855,534 rubles.
Also, according to the database in the possession of the editorial team, 37 Kyrgyz companies (LLC / JSC / branches) are involved in the A7 group scheme, as well as several affiliated crypto structures.
According to the extracts and accounting balances of the main Kyrgyz companies, from the end of 2024 to the middle of 2025, over 486 billion rubles (approximately 6 billion dollars) have passed through these structures. The largest firms are: “Ala-Too Trade Group” – 273.3 billion rubles; “A7-Kyrgyzstan” – 110.2 billion rubles; “Talas Global Merchants” – 75.2 billion rubles.