Russia could try to invade Moldova if the war in Ukraine ends in its favor, according to an analysis by experts at the Institute for the Study of War. At the moment, a land or naval invasion is impossible as long as Kyiv holds out. But that’s not stopping Moscow from pursuing the hybrid warfare it is very good at, which may eventually set the stage for a full-scale incursion into Moldova.
Moldova notably falls within Russian President Vladimir Putin’s geographic definition of the Russian World (Russkiy Mir), which Putin claimed in late 2023 encompasses the territories of Ancient Rus’ (Kyivan Rus), the Kingdom of Muscovy, the Russian Empire, the Soviet Union, and the contemporary Russian Federation. Russia has repeatedly invoked its alleged need to protect Russian “compatriots abroad,” including in Moldova. Moldova’s membership in the EU would mark a major setback for the Kremlin’s efforts to gain control over its asserted sphere of influence and would threaten the stability of Putin’s regime, as a reformed and prosperous Moldova would be another example of a former Soviet state benefiting from its chosen path towards the West. Continued progress towards Moldova’s EU membership would follow both Ukraine’s and Armenia’s reorientations towards the West in recent years and will impose reputational costs on Moscow as the security and economic guarantor in the former Soviet space.
The Kremlin has not given up its objective of reestablishing its influence over Chisinau despite Moldova’s recent movement towards the West. Moldova has maintained various levels of relations with the EU over the past 30 years, including signing an Association Agreement in 2014. The pro-Western Sandu presidency and the PAS parliamentary majority in 2020 and 2021 likely pushed the Kremlin to reevaluate its long-term plans in Moldova. Leaked documents reportedly drafted in 2021 outlined the Kremlin’s plans to increase Moldova’s involvement in the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and Eurasian Economic Union by 2030, including by proliferating Russian media, maintaining Russian gas supplies, and elevating the status of the Russian language in Moldova. The start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 likely derailed these plans, but the Kremlin appears to have since turned to more extreme measures to destabilize Moldova, including coup attempts, false flag operations, and energy blackmail. The Kremlin’s objectives in Moldova have stayed consistent throughout these shifts, and Sandu’s possible reelection in 2024 is unlikely to deter future Kremlin influence operations in Moldova. Continued Moldovan efforts to counter Russia’s malign influence may even push the Kremlin to adapt and resort to new methods.
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The Kremlin has leveraged its long-established military exclave in Transnistria and deepened political and economic ties within Moldova to prevent Moldova’s Western integration and will continue to do so. Russia has maintained about 1,500 troops in the pro-Russian breakaway parastate of Transnistria since Russia militarily intervened to support Transnistrian separatists in 1992 following the fall of the Soviet Union and Moldova’s independence. The Kremlin has also significantly increased its ties to the Moldovan autonomous region of Gagauzia since March 2024. US-sanctioned, pro-Kremlin Moldovan opposition politician Ilan Shor has been integral to expanding Russian malign influence operations in Moldova, especially in Gagauzia. The Constitutional Court designated the Shor Party as unconstitutional and banned the party in July 2023, but Shor maintained his influence in Moldovan politics, especially through the creation of the Kremlin-affiliated “Victory” electoral bloc of Moldovan opposition parties in April 2024. These long-standing and deepening ties offer the Kremlin multiple tools with which to influence Moldovan — and European — society and politics.