“…And it increasingly seems that Moscow will not allow Transnistrian leaders to alleviate the effects of the crisis on the left bank of the Dniester until it spills over to the right bank. In this sense, the collusion between Moscow and Tiraspol will continue ‘to the end,’ meaning until the results of the upcoming parliamentary elections are announced.”
Russia will supply gas to Slovakia via alternative routes after Ukraine stopped transit through its territory. This is the latest news actively promoted by Russian media. These are the same sources that have previously supported the Russian authorities’ narrative, claiming that with the cessation of transit through Ukraine, “Gazprom was deprived of the technical and legal capacity to supply gas to Transnistria starting January 1, 2025.” These same sources continue to overlook the fact that alternative routes could and can still be used successfully to supply gas to the Transnistrian region in strict compliance with contractual obligations in effect until 2026 and international norms governing the gas sector, IPN reports.
The Slovak case as an illustration for Transnistria
One could end the debate here on who bears responsibility for the unprecedented energy and humanitarian crisis affecting all residents and economic entities in the region controlled by the separatist regime in Tiraspol. But we won’t because this latest example of Russia’s duplicity convincingly reveals the mechanisms by which Moscow achieves its goals, both in general and in Transnistria specifically. The essence of these mechanisms is encapsulated in the term “alliance” in the title, and viewed through this lens, the trends in our region’s crisis appear deeply troubling.
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The case of Russia’s alliance with Slovakia is more recent and therefore more illustrative, including for understanding the potential trajectory of events in Transnistria and Moldova as a whole. Russia is willing to supply gas to this EU member state via alternative routes in exchange for the Slovak leadership’s readiness to sabotage the EU’s position on Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and for direct attacks against Ukraine. These attacks include threats to stop electricity supplies from Slovakia to Ukraine and to reduce aid previously provided to some 130,000 Ukrainian refugees who fled the war and sought refuge in Slovakia.
Who gains what from the alliance?
What does Slovakia gain in return? It receives lower prices for Russian gas compared to market rates, potentially retains some “easy” income from the transit of Russian gas that it received while the gas flowed through Ukraine, and gains greater financial and logistical means to promote its internal and external policies, which are populist, isolationist, and fundamentally anti-European. These interests align with those of Russia and are supported by it.
It is worth noting that in this alliance, Russia appears to incur certain losses, at least financially: tariff losses, additional costs for the more expensive transportation of gas via alternative routes (a supplier’s obligation). Russia may also suffer reputational losses, were it to care about such matters, as it provides privileges to a country where it has few or no citizens or “compatriots,” while hosting many citizens of a country it is at war with and indirectly or directly supports. Thus, at this stage of the alliance, Russia seems to be the side “paying more” than its Slovak partner. However, there should be no illusions: the time will come when Russia will demand full repayment, and then some, as it has with other similar alliances and as is happening now with Transnistria.
A Crucial note on Russia’s alliance with Slovakia
It is important to clarify that this refers more to the “current leadership of Slovakia” rather than the country as a whole, as Slovak society has been actively protesting in recent days and weeks against the government and against “dragging the country into the orbit of Russian interests.” Yet this is an essential feature of alliances orchestrated by Russia: they are implemented through specific leaders who exhibit political, financial, moral, or psychological vulnerabilities. Even former leaders of the most powerful European and non-European states have succumbed to Russian temptations, primarily in the form of financial offers “that cannot be refused.” Meanwhile, some current leaders aim to use Russian support and their populist, isolationist, and fundamentally anti-European policies to secure lifelong positions of power, following Putin’s model.
Russia Provided the Leaders of Transnistria with “An Estate for Free”
What is currently happening in Transnistria is clearly the result of an alliance initiated at the beginning of the 1990s between successive authorities of the Russian Federation and the leaders of the separatist regime in Transnistria. The formula has always been simple. Russia provides the regime with military, economic, social, financial, ideological, and propagandistic support—all practically free of charge. The $11 billion worth of gas that has never been paid for is just one example. To be clear: the support was primarily directed at the regimes, although ordinary people benefited from it to some extent. Without this support, the separatist administrations would have lost their positions of power in no time, as it would have taken the population only a short while to realize their economic, social, financial, and even military, ideological, and propagandistic inconsistency.
But there is something that Russia has provided exclusively to the political and economic leaders of Transnistria, massively and for free. It gave them this territory as their “personal estate,” where they were allowed to do anything for their own massive benefit. This included total smuggling, a complete lack of accountability for the extremely low standard of living of the majority of the population, the violation of democratic and human rights laws, and the establishment of a regime of fear and terror, where there is no place for any opposition—just like in Russia itself. And now, following the logic of Russia’s alliance, the time has come for the separatist leaders to pay their dues at any cost, even if that cost means the destruction of the fate of the entire population in the region.
The inconsistency of the regime as a bargaining chip in the alliance
Understanding this mechanism of the Moscow-Tiraspol alliance is absolutely necessary to grasp what is happening and what might happen as a result of this crisis or humanitarian catastrophe, which risks spreading to the rest of the territory of the Republic of Moldova. Schematically, the mechanism looks like this:
- The crisis was provoked by the leadership of the Russian Federation through the cessation of gas supplies, violating contractual obligations and international norms governing the gas sector.
- Responsibility is shifted to Ukraine, the West, and the Government of Moldova, despite the fact that Ukraine simply ceased financing Russia’s war, which kills hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians and destroys hundreds and thousands of localities to the ground. Meanwhile, the West and Moldova sincerely offer aid to the people of the eastern region.
- The target audience for this disinformation is the region’s population, especially the approximately 200,000 “citizens and compatriots of Russia” whom Moscow wants to assure that their defense is an “absolute priority” of its foreign policy.
- The responsibility for managing the crisis in the eastern region has been left to Tiraspol’s administration, inconsistent as it is, as part of its alliance with Russia.
Was Tiraspol’s inability planned?
Was the Tiraspol administration intentionally left to handle this, counting on its failure? Was this part of a calculation that such conditions would inevitably spread the energy and humanitarian crisis across the entire territory of Moldova? Did the Transnistrian leaders know from the beginning about these strategic goals and that Russia would not resume gas supplies, thereby not saving Transnistria?
Judging by the behavior of these leaders, the answers are more likely affirmative. Why? Because otherwise, they would have contacted Moldovan authorities, at least for consultations, long before the actual crisis began—perhaps during the visit of Moldova’s former energy minister to Gazprom, to request an extension of gas supplies specifically for the Transnistrian region, with no regard for the right bank. Otherwise, they would have accepted offers of help from Moldovan authorities—or at least some of them—or at least pretended to discuss them. They would not have resorted to blatant lies like “we did not receive offers of help,” knowing there is documented evidence to the contrary, and that a large part of the region’s gas reserves is already stored in pipelines on the right bank of the Dniester and in Romania. They would not have used another lie about the “lack of dollar and euro accounts” for purchasing gas on the market, knowing they are not recognized anywhere in the world as actors in gas transactions—or in any other capacity.
Where Is the Alliance Headed?
The most critical problem in overcoming the crisis and preventing its spread to the rest of Moldova lies in the fact that the only “partner” for (non)dialogue with Chișinău is the de facto leadership of Tiraspol. Why won’t they engage in dialogue? Because dialogue with conditions set by Chișinău means political death for them and the separatist structure as a whole. They refuse dialogue because they understand this danger, as does Moscow, which strictly prohibits them from engaging in dialogue. It is clear that Moscow has taken steps in advance to ensure they obediently fulfill their mission, particularly through methods of blackmail and threats. Thus, the refusal of Tiraspol’s leaders to communicate with Chișinău remains the main obstacle to resolving the current crisis.
It is true that this situation also highlights the weakness of Chișinău’s government, which either did not want or failed to create other dialogue partners in the region, uninvolved in Russia’s alliance scheme.The main reason for the refusal of the separatist leaders to communicate with Chișinău becomes even clearer when considering that Moscow chose a very specific moment to halt gas deliveries to the Transnistrian region: in the middle of winter, on the same day that transit through Ukraine was cut off, and on the eve of upcoming parliamentary elections in the Republic of Moldova.
All of Russia’s actions up to this point, including during last year’s referendum and presidential elections, suggest that Moscow will not abandon its strategic goal of replacing the current pro-European government with one that is pro-Russian.
This objective can only be achieved by provoking significant dissatisfaction among Moldovan voters. Provoking a humanitarian crisis in Transnistria, which over time could spill over to the right bank of the Dniester, is, from Moscow’s perspective, the most effective way to achieve this.
Does anyone believe that Russia has abandoned its attempts to return Moldova to its sphere of influence? Does anyone think that Russia is capable of giving up its strategic goal and resuming gas supplies in the near future to “save Transnistria, its citizens, and compatriots,” thereby sabotaging its own interest in toppling the current government in the mid-year elections?
The answers are most likely negative. Therefore, the leaders of Tiraspol, as part of Russia’s alliance, will not communicate with Chișinău any time before those parliamentary elections. And it increasingly seems that Moscow will not allow them to mitigate the crisis on the left bank of the Dniester until it spills over to the right bank.
In this sense, the alliance between Moscow and Tiraspol seems likely to continue “until the end”—that is, until the results of the upcoming parliamentary elections are announced.
P.S. From the Romanian Dictionary (DEX):
- “Cârdășie” – a partnership or alliance with condemnable goals.
- “Complot” – a secret agreement between several individuals to conspire against a person, a state, etc.