Commentary by Iulian Groza, IPRE Executive Director
This week, our colleagues from the REUNIR consortium, a Horizon Europe project in which IPRE is a partner, published a new Occasional Paper authored by Niklas Balbon and Julia Friedrich from the Global Public Policy Institute (GPPi). The title is suggestive: “Rationales in the Dark”. In short, the authors analyzed 51 reports and articles on the influence of Russia and China in the Western Balkans, Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia. They came to a conclusion that deserves attention. We have no shortage of descriptions of the methods used by Moscow, but much less analysis of what Beijing is doing in the region. And more importantly, we lack rigorous empirical assessments of the motivations behind these actions. That is, we assume a lot, but we have little hard evidence.
For us in Moldova, this observation has a special relevance when it comes to China. On Russian interference, we have a whole library of reports, analyses and journalistic investigations. On China’s objectives and presence, however, we talk much less. Or, when we do, we oscillate between two equally unhelpful extremes: to label it as non-existent, or vice–versa, as an existential threat under the radar of our observations.
But what do we know concretely? Moldova is not part of the Belt and Road Initiative, unlike Serbia, Albania or Montenegro. The volume of bilateral trade remains modest, but with a consistent deficit in favor of China, especially in recent years, when Chinese products have started to be imported more and more often. Who among us hasn’t bought something online on Temu or AliExpress? The mobile phone market abounds in Chinese products. New 5G technologies, globally but also in Moldova, are increasingly looking to Chinese suppliers. And if we take a look at the roads, we see more and more Chinese-made cars. And rightly so, because they have become more and more attractive in terms of price and equipment compared to European or American manufacturers. The available data confirms this shift. In 2025, Chinese-made cars became the top-selling new vehicles on Moldova’s market for the first time on record, reaching a striking 26.1% share of total new vehicle imports — compared to 15.1% in 2024 and just over 7% in 2023.
However, Chinese direct investment flows in Moldova are, for now, minor. China’s diplomatic and academic presence exists, but discreetly, at least formally. However, I think that many were able to notice a visible dynamism of China’s diplomatic activity in Chisinau, easy to follow on the Facbookpage of the Chinese Embassy in the Republic of Moldova. It is a development worth appreciating, but also worth watching closely. So far, the picture seems balanced.
What do we not know and what is worth checking? GPPi colleagues note that in the case of China, the serious debate is precisely on the question of whether economic activity serves political objectives. For Moldova, a few questions remain unanswered empirically. What about supply chains for telecommunications equipment and 5G components? Who are the real beneficiaries of public procurement in the field of transport infrastructure and technology? What academic and research partnerships exist between Moldovan universities and Chinese institutions, and on what terms? What role could Moldova play as a possible logistical corridor between the Black Sea ports, with a focus on Constanta and, potentially, Giurgiulesti, but also the EU’s single market? These are not rhetorical questions. These are questions that will have to be answered sooner rather than later.
The digital dimension deserves special attention. Digital technologies are critical infrastructure today, and the dependencies that are built today will be difficult to break down in five years. Here the risks are less visible, but they are no less real. We’re talking about networking equipment, artificial intelligence components, or e-commerce platforms. It’s not about demonizing a country or a technology. It is a question of asking ourselves the questions that the EU is already asking, and of having our own answers.
Why does this matter for our European path? As Moldova moves forward in EU accession negotiations, we need to align with the EU Economic Security Toolbox, the suite of tools for screening foreign direct investment, dual-use export controls, research protection, and resilience of critical supply chains. This is in addition to the new EU cybersecurity regulation proposed earlier this year by the European Commission, which aims to strengthen cybersecurity capabilities and resilience, prevent fragmentation of the Digital Single Market, secure ICT supply chains and make it easier to certify digital products. These instruments were designed at EU level, to a considerable extent, precisely with the risks related to China in mind. The sooner and more firmly we align ourselves with this framework, the more we avoid the situation where we discover a vulnerability after it has taken hold. This becomes all the more relevant for a country negotiating accession and aiming to be ready to become a member of the EU by 2030.
What is to be done, concretely? Here are five directions, in order of priority, that are worth thinking about and discussing.
First, to ensure the full functionality of the screening mechanism for foreign direct investment in critical sectors, especially digital infrastructure, energy, transport, ports, research with dual-use applications. A legal framework already exists in Moldova through Law no. 174/2021 on the mechanism for examining investments of importance for state security and Government Decision no. 437/2025 on the Council for the examination of investments of importance for state security. It is essential that this Council becomes truly operational, and that the transposition of EU Regulation 2019/452 is complete and substantive.
Second, an audit of the 5G ecosystem and telecommunications infrastructure, following the EU 5G Toolbox model of 2020, to be carried out in Moldova in cooperation with the operators offering these services. A technical assessment, with objective criteria and operational consequences. This also entails prioritising the transposition of Commission Recommendation (EU) 2019/534 of 26 March 2019 on the cybersecurity of 5G networks. At the moment, the 2025-2027 Implementation Program of the Digital Transformation Strategy 2023-2030 provides for the deadline of the fourth quarter of 2027. I think it’s worth accelerating.
Third, mandatory transparency on academic and research cooperation with third-country entities, with a particular focus on dual-use research. An approach aligned with the European one on cultural and academic cooperation with China, which prevents undue influence through funding channels and ensures that this cooperation cannot be instrumentalized as a mechanism of foreign interference.
Fourth, the integration of Moldova into the European mechanisms for the exchange of information on economic security issues, an area to which, as a candidate state, we can have gradual access, if we demonstrate institutional capacity. Alignment with the European Commission Recommendation of 3 October 2023 on technology areas critical to EU economic security and risk assessments carried out with Member States.
Fifth, and perhaps hardest, a better analytical culture. We need more empirical research, not more assumptions. Our colleagues at REUNIR recommend three things that apply perfectly to us: (a) transparent marking of the limits of our knowledge, (b) mixed methods that triangulate different sources, and (c) foresight and forecast scenario exercises that stress-test counter-measures according to different motivational assumptions.
In conclusion, the risk, in the case of China, is not that Moldova is captive. It is not. The risk is that, because the problem seems distant, we do not build the detection and response mechanisms before they are needed. When we talk about malign foreign influence, our reflex to focus almost exclusively on Russia is justified by the immediate reality, but we must not overlook other potential risks. As it happens, the tools that protect us from one of these sources of risk can largely protect us from the other. All that remains is to build them. And to build them on time.